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R.EsPoNsmILITY OF STATES FOR UNLAWFUL Acrs OF THEIR ARMED
FORCES. By Alwyn V. Freeman. [Text of lectures reprinted from the
Recueil de Cours de l'Academie de Droit International de La Haye
(1955 II, Pp. 267-415, Vol. 88 of the Series) for private circulation only.]

Dr. Freeman has had reprinted in book form for private publication
his Hague Lectures in 1955 on the significant and specialized topic of the
responsibility of states for unlawful acts of their armed forces. Appendices
containing diplomatic notes, United States Government memoranda,
Allied control laws and regulations, international agreements, and congressional documents increase the value of the separate volume. Since there are
relatively few law libraries in this country that contain the bound volumes
of the Hague Academy, it is regrettable that these and some of the
other lectures in the series cannot be made more accessible to scholars
and practitioners through the device of reprinting individual lectures
in separate volumes for public distribution. Separate publication might
lead to more comprehensive reviews in a wider variety of journals and
consequent greater awareness in the profession of the value and availability of the Hague Lectures. The magnitude of the task of reviewing
the Hague Academy volumes may well explain the paucity of systematic
and thorough analyses of these Lectures. This is a salient example
of the bibliographical difficulties which impede the development of a
wider knowledge and interest in international law at a time when such
knowledge and interest is of vital importance.
Dr. Freeman has assembled a wide range of materials of value to
practicing lawyers, government officials, and scholars. The developing
practice of stationing armed forces in friendly countries for lengthy
periods in peace time enhances the importance of greater understanding
of the governing principles, practices, and procedures. The author's
previous publications in the field of state responsibility and his extensive
experience provide an excellent basis for this specialized study.
A summary of the volume's contents and of Dr. Freeman's views on
significant topics should illustrate the value of his intensive analysis
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of the subject. Following a brief introduction and outline of the scope
of the lectures, the first chapter surveys the general principles of state
responsibility as they have developed in the practice of states and the
views of publicists. In discussing responsibility for official acts, it is urged
that there is no distinction in principle between major and minor officials
of a state. What acts of minor officials, and, particularly, of soldiers should
impose responsibility can be usefully determined by an adaptation of
Professor Dunn's theory of risk allocation. Responsibility for acts of soldiers
is not limited to authorized acts but includes all acts apparently authorized
if reasonably related to duty. In time of peace, purely personal acts do
not give rise to responsibility whereas, ironically, the reverse is true in
time of war.
The second chapter develops the basis of responsibility for military
activities both in time of war and peace. For the war situation, responsibility is intimately linked to the laws of war which provide an exemption
for legitimate military operations. It follows, in principle, that states
are responsible for violations of the laws of war. So far as liability between
belligerents is concerned, precedents and procedures vindicating the principle in practice are scarce, due largely to waiver by the losers in peace
treaties following hostilities. Although claims of neutrals remain, these
have been frequently settled by payment as an "act of grace" and thus
impede the development of authoritative precedents. The principles of
the laws of war have been "whittled away to some degree" by the practice
in the last two great wars. Discussing a few of the rules in Hague Convention IV on Land Warfare, for example, continuing vitality is attributed
to the prohibition of confiscation of enemy private property despite the
evidence to the contrary in the World War II peace treaties. Support for
this position is found in the Dirksen and Johnson bills which were introduced in Congress, although no final action upon them has been taken,
and many of our war-time allies are strongly opposed to their enactment.
With respect to liability in time of peace, the author challenges the view
that responsibility exists only if the acts were authorized or if there was
failure of supervision. He argues that the precedents justify the imposition
of greater responsibility for acts of soldiers than other state agents because
of the greater likelihood of harm, and that responsibility exists for
negligent acts of soldiers in course of duty whether or not authorized or
supervised.
Chapter Three divides the discussion of responsibility for the acts
of individual soldiers in time of war into two periods. The first relates
to responsibility as developed prior to Hague Convention IV of 1907.
In the earlier period, pillage, for example, was not illegal, and to this
fact is assigned the reluctance of international tribunals to impose responsibility in such cases even after pillage was formally proscribed in
Hague Convention IV and other international conventions. Although
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acknowledging that pillage in practice µnfortunately continues, these
conventions, and particularly Hague Convention IV, are viewed as
working a great change in the law in force. The discussion of the postHague period is devoted to an intensive analysis of the language of
Article 3 of Hague Convention IV. This Article confirmed the existing
liability of belligerents for violations of the laws of war and created a
civil responsibility of the state for all acts committed by its armed forces.
This state civil responsibility includes "war crimes." Article 3 imposes
responsibility for all acts in violation of the Regulations of the Hague
Convention, but is not exclusive with respect to responsibility under
international law outside the Convention. The author disputes the
contention of some other writers that Article 3 creates absolute responsibility, citing in support of his position the similar official view adopted
by the U.S. War Department during World War II.
Chapter Four considers responsibility for acts of soldiers in foreign
territory. The first part discusses illegalities committed in friendly countries and is primarily devoted to the practice of the United States. As
a matter of analysis, these matters are governed by the same principles that
have been applied in "shore leave" cases. The settlement of many of these
controversies_ by payments as "acts of grace" is, however, acknowledged
to be a widespread practice. The same tendency to settle on a broader
basis is reflected in United States legislation. In the Foreign Claims Act
of 1942, the United States has assumed approximately the position of an
insurer without reference to responsibility under international law, although the limitations in that act are duly noted. Similarly, the special
Agreements entered into, by the United States in World War II attempted
to provide for relief beyond international law, and to adjust to local
administration. In the discussion of responsibility for acts of U.N. forces
in the Korean conflict, the author asserts that the individual nations
remained responsible; that the U.N. was not; and raises the question as to
whether the United States was responsible for acts of other armed forces
under United States command. He concludes this section with a discussion
of the refusal of the United States to accept responsibility in paternity
cases, particularly in Iceland, and suggests that some relief should be
provided by agreement even though no legal liability exists. The second
part of Chapter Four deals briefty with the precedents concerning responsibility of the occupant for acts of soldiers in territory under military
occupation in the period prior to World War II. The author believes
that responsibility in this area is governed by essentially the same principles that are applicable to acts of soldiers within the territorial
jurisdiction.
The final chapter provides a valuable discussion of the claims settlement procedures in the period after hostilities have ended. The author
asserts that the responsibility of the occupying power should be the same
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as that of a territorial sovereign in time of peace because of the similar
"control of the area." United States practice after World War I is first
briefly reported. There follows a thorough recital of allied practice and
procedures after World War II. The similarity between our practice in
the United States zone in Germany and our practice in liberated France
is noted, as well as the limitations on liability in Germany. The developments in other occupied areas are also described and compared with our
experience in Germany. The next section of the final chapter analyzes
the impact of peace treaty provisions on responsibility. It recounts the
new arrangements in World War II by the victors for restitution of
identifiable property in lieu of damages as well as the provisions for the
retention of enemy assets seized by the victors within their own borders.
The standard provisions for inclusive waiver by the losers of all their
claims both for violation of war rules and occupation acts are contrasted
with the responsibility of victorious belligerents for alleged violations of
the laws of war under Article 3 of Hague Convention IV.
The final section of the chapter outlines the novel and extensive
provisions for civil liability for tortious acts contained in the Status
of Forces Agreements between the N.A.T.O. powers. In these special
arrangements, which are characterized as both necessary and as the most
radical and interesting development, there is provision for intergovernmental waiver in "duty" cases and an effective procedure for compensation
with respect to private claims. In "line of duty" cases, payment by the
local government in accordance with local law is followed by seventy-five
percent reimbursement by the government of the visiting force. For socalled "private acts," either the visiting force settles the claim as a matter
of grace, or the soldier can be sued in the local courts.
In conclusion, the author asserts that there has been a "striking
progression" in liability for wrongful acts of a state's armed forces,
especially in war and hostile occupation. He sees, also, a similar but less
pronounced evolution in the standards for responsibility in time of peace,
which is particularly marked in friendly countries. But the development
of this trend, in his opinion, continues to depend on the viability of international law itself.
Without detracting from the acclaim which this careful monograph
deserves, this reviewer must confess some dissatisfaction with the traditional
approach which it exemplifies. The author's detailed treatment of arbitral
decisions on the basis of their importance as legal rules that regulate
effectively the conduct of states is not persuasive. His apparent acceptance
of the continued vitality of many of the Hague Articles, despite widespread violation in two World Wars and their frequent negation by
peace treaty provisions, is not convincing. The alleged inviolability of
enemy property may be cited as an example. In my opinion, the provisions
of the peace treaties, concluded after widespread hostilities by numerous
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participants, are a better indication of the practice of states. The inclusive
waiver in those treaties by the losers of all claims for violation of the
laws of war is a far more significant development. The same may be said
of the common provision for waiver of liability for occupation acts and
the frequent payment of claims as "acts of grace." The principles and
procedures created by United States legislation and by the Status of
Forces Agreements are a more trustworthy guide to the responsibilities
actually assumed by many of the principal states concerned with the
problem in peace time. A broader view of "law" would consider that
this national legislation and these treaty provisions constitute the core
of the "law" in force. Intensive analysis of their administration would be
the most promising avenue of exploration. Further study and development
of the "law" in these documents and arising out of their administration
will furnish the basis for further progress in this important area.
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